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Abstract: This contribution analyses if and under what conditions bottom-up pressures constrain the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Neofunctionalists famously explained the power of the 
Court by its use of ‘law as a mask and shield’. Due to its technical nature, the Court is able to mask the 
political substance of ‘integration through law’ and to shield it from political challenges. We revisit this 
argument in times of politicization of the EU and develop a typology of four constellations depending 
on different kinds of bottom-up pressures. We argue that depoliticized integration through law still 
functions, to varying degrees, in face of either governmental contestation or public politicization. By 
contrast, if member state governments and the public jointly oppose further integration through law, 
the Court is constrained as further expansive jurisprudence could even reinforce politicization and risk 
political backlash. We illustrate our argument with case law on EU citizenship.  
Keywords: Court of Justice, EU Citizenship, Integration through Law, Neofunctionalism, Politicization  
Introduction 
Among all major EU institutions, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is the least likely to be affected 
by the bottom-up politicization of EU decision-making. The Court has been famously described as 
‘tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg’ (Stein 1981: 1) to stress the remoteness of 
European judges from EU political battles, let alone broader public attention. As with any court, the 
CJEU’s authority rests on its perception as a non-political actor, settling conflicts by technical-legal 
means, and hence, CJEU judges have no interest in becoming agents of politicization. Rather, the 
Court’s ability to depoliticize conflicts is a crucial precondition for its role as an engine of integration. 
Due to its technical-legal nature, neofunctionalists have argued, law serves as a ‘mask and shield’, 
which obscures the political substance of CJEU jurisprudence and protects it from political challenges.  
And yet, the CJEU is not immune against bottom-up pressures. Escaping the ‘dictate’ from Luxembourg 
was a major issue during Brexit negotiations. More generally, research on courts and politics has shown 
that judges do not rule in a political vacuum, but are responsive to changes in the broader ‘political 
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mood’(McGuire and Stimson 2004). Against the background of increasing EU politicization, we 
therefore revisit Burley and Mattli’s classical argument about ‘law as a mask and shield’.  
We develop a typology of four constellations depending on whether CJEU jurisprudence is subject to 
bottom-up pressures stemming from member state governments and/or politicization. Based on our 
distinction of bottom-up pressures, we qualify the ‘mask and shield’ argument in two respects. First, 
even if ‘shielded’ against outright political attacks, CJEU jurisprudence remains vulnerable to 
governmental contestation by legal means. Integration through law scholars underestimated member 
states’ ability to contain the impact of expansive CJEU jurisprudence through creative compliance at 
the domestic level and legislative corrections at the EU level. Second, we argue that the Court faces a 
‘constraining consensus’ if further expansive jurisprudence is not only contested by member state 
governments, but faces also public politicization. Under these circumstances, judges have to choose 
between self-restraint and the risk of political backlash (Madsen et al. 2018).  
The following theoretical section briefly summarizes the original neofunctionalist account, before we 
develop our own argument and typology of different constellations of CJEU contestation. 
Subsequently, we illustrate these four ideal typical constellations with empirical evidence from the 
area of EU citizenship, complemented with examples from other policy areas. The concluding section 
discusses the prospects of further Court-driven integration through law in times of politicization.  
Law as a Mask and Shield Revisited  
The original argument 
In their seminal article ‘Europe before the Court’ from 1993, Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli 
applied neofunctionalist theory to explain the CJEU’s strength as an engine of integration (Burley and 
Mattli 1993). The Court, they argued, often ruled in favor of further integration to an extent that goes 
significantly beyond what could be reached by the political agreement of governments alone. Crucially, 
this integration through law depends on the distinctiveness of the legal domain:  
‘Law functions as a mask for politics, precisely the role neofunctionalists originally forecast for 
economics. The need for a ‘functional’ domain to circumvent the direct clash of political interests 
is the central insight of neofunctionalist theory. This domain could never be completely separated 
from the political sphere but would at least provide a sufficient buffer to achieve results that 
could not be directly obtained in the political realm’ (Burley and Mattli 1993: 44).  
Burley and Mattli linked their argument already explicitly to (de)politicization: ‘The strength of the 
functional domain as an incubator of integration depends on the relative resistance of that domain to 
3 
 
politicization’ (ibid.: 44). Court judgments appear as ‘technical’, they deny the ‘existence of policy 
discretion’ and provide ‘nonpolitical justification(s)’ for ‘purportedly neutral’ decisions, which derive 
from their ‘distinctive methodology and logic’, in short: they follow the ‘inexorable logic of law’ (ibid.: 
69-73). Due to these characteristics, case law ‘functions both as a mask and shield’ (ibid.: 74). The 
political implications of judgments are hidden behind their technical-legal language. And as long as no-
one wants to call the Court’s general authority into question, individual rulings are protected from 
outright political contestation, i.e. politically unwelcome case law can only be challenged on its own 
legal terms.  
While Burley’s and Mattli’s argument deals with the depoliticizing effect of law and courts in general, 
it applies particularly to the EU context. Appointments to the CJEU are much less prone to politicization 
than, for example, to the US Supreme Court (Ferejohn 2002: 65), and the selection process of CJEU 
judges has been largely professionalized on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty (Dumbrovsky et al. 2014). 
Moreover, apart from efficiency considerations, internal decision-making at the CJEU remains largely 
shielded from public scrutiny. While greater openness and transparent reasoning might arguably 
improve the legal quality of the Court’s jurisprudence (Weiler 2013), European judges have always 
cared greatly about maintaining the non-political appearance of their case law, e.g. through the short 
and apodictic style of many judgments, the confidentiality of their internal decision-making and the 
absence of dissenting opinions.  
Two qualifications 
25 years after its original publication, the ‘law as a mask and shield’ argument is still one of the most 
prominent accounts of CJEU-driven integration through law; arguably holding a similar status as 
standard reference among political scientists as Joseph Weiler’s ‘Transformation of Europe’ (1991) in 
the legal field. Yet, the neofunctionalist argument is not uncontested. Empirically, it has been noted 
that Burley and Mattli offered little evidence for their argument beyond the evolution of CJEU legal 
doctrine itself (Stone Sweet 2010: 16). Subsequent research delivered strong support for some of their 
claims, e.g. regarding the enabling role of subnational actors such as domestic courts, lawyers and 
private litigants (Alter 1998a; Cichowski 2004; Kelemen 2011; but see also Conant et al. 2018 for many 
open questions regarding EU legal mobilization). Theoretically, historical institutionalists explained the 
acceptance of expansive CJEU jurisprudence alternatively by emphasizing the short time horizons of 
politicians rather than the inherent qualities of law (Pierson 1996; Alter 1998b). Moreover, it has been 
criticized that neofunctionalists were largely ignorant of the limitations of integration through law 
(Alter 1998b: 121). And indeed, Burley’s and Mattli’s original account shows only little concern for 
potential qualifications of the ‘mask and shield’ argument: in order to be accepted as law, CJEU 
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jurisprudence just needs to exhibit ‘a minimal degree of fidelity to both substantive law and the 
methodological constraints imposed by legal reasoning’ (Burley and Mattli 1993: 44) and in order not 
to lose its overall legitimacy, the Court must not ‘outrun its constituency’ (Mattli and Slaughter 1998: 
181). 
In the following, we do not seek to present an alternative account, but we introduce two qualifications 
concerning both the shield and the mask aspects of CJEU jurisprudence, which are inspired by recent 
research on (i) judicial impact and on (ii) politicization.  
First, the shield of EU law is not impenetrable. When confronted with unwelcome case law, EU member 
state governments typically do not challenge the Court’s overall authority politically, but they may seek 
to limit the Court’s impact by legal means. Burley and Mattli captured judicial impact only partially. 
Although they defined their dependent variable in terms of a ‘gradual penetration of EC law into the 
domestic law of its member states’ (Burley and Mattli 1993: 43), their empirical analysis focused on 
the development and acceptance of CJEU legal doctrine rather than on broader policy impact. Probably 
the most radical way to limit the Court without questioning its existing authority is the exclusion from 
new areas of integration (ibid.: 74). Apart from exclusion, a growing body of research on CJEU judicial 
impact has analyzed member states’ more subtle ways to control and limit the effects of expansive 
jurisprudence. At the European level, member states may adopt secondary legislation to modify the 
implications of existing and to preempt future case law. Whereas outright legislative override of CJEU 
jurisprudence is rare, member states have been found to draft secondary legislation carefully in order 
to circumscribe the Court’s policy impact (Martinsen 2015). At the domestic level, the impact of 
unwelcome Court jurisprudence may be effectively limited in the process of implementation. As with 
legislative override at the EU level, member states rarely opt for open non-compliance at the domestic 
level. Rather, they resort to creative forms of compliance, e.g. by limiting the Court’s impact to the 
individual conflict at issue (Conant 2002) or by carefully designing domestic reforms ‘with Luxemburg 
in mind’, which are likely to survive future lawsuits while minimizing substantive policy change 
(Blauberger 2012).  
Secondly, the political substance of the Court’s case law has become harder to mask. Burley and Mattli 
wrote their original piece still under the impression of the ‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 
2009). Since then, politicization of European governance has increased in terms of visibility, 
polarization and engagement beyond elite actors (de Wilde et al. 2016; Bressanelli et al. 2019). And, 
closely linked to this overall trend, CJEU jurisdiction has come to involve ever more politically sensitive 
issues such as citizenship or welfare rights, which forces the Court to engage in delicate value 
judgments and interest evaluations (Kelemen 2016: 126f.). As a consequence, even when adhering 
perfectly to legal methodology and existing doctrine, CJEU judges may be confronted with 
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politicization. Particularly, the visibility or salience dimension of politicization is important for our 
discussion of bottom-up pressures on the Court. Arguably, actor expansion might rather reinforce EU 
legal mobilization (cf. Kelemen 2011) and polarization might increase CJEU independence as it reduces 
the risk of politically agreed counter-action (Larsson and Naurin 2019: 12). By contrast, if politicization 
involves salient public opposition against further integration in an area of CJEU jurisdiction, it can have 
a constraining effect on the Court. Studies on domestic high courts have shown that public opinion 
places a constraint on judicial decision-making and that judges respond to changes in the broader 
political context (McGuire and Stimson 2004). Recent research on international courts also emphasizes 
the importance of contextual factors for judicial authority (Alter et al. 2018), including diffuse public 
support or opposition. Even if the vast majority of CJEU judgments do not reach broad visibility, newly 
collected data on newspaper coverage of CJEU jurisprudence shows that a considerable share of case 
law is in fact reported by main European newspapers (Dederke 2018: 18). Moreover, there is empirical 
evidence that CJEU actually do ‘read the morning papers’ (Blauberger et al. 2018).  
Four constellations of CJEU contestation 
Following from the preceding discussion, we distinguish two kinds of bottom-up pressures for the 
Court. On the one hand, a large part of the political science literature on the CJEU takes a state-centric 
approach and addresses the Court’s relationship to member state governments. Essentially, the 
question is how far CJEU judges can go in promoting integration through law and making it effective 
even against opposition from member state governments. While we cannot define a precise cut-off 
point of how many member governments constitute a bottom-up pressure on the Court, governmental 
contestation is typically regarded to be greater, the more member governments oppose an expansive 
EU legal interpretation in their written observations to the Court (Larsson and Naurin 2016: 396; 
Carrubba and Gabel 2015: 84). On the other hand, we add public politicization as a separate kind of 
bottom-up pressure potentially affecting the Court’s independence and impact. 
Combining these two kinds of bottom-up pressures, four constellations of Court contestation are 
possible (see Table 1) and each constellation has different implications for the Court’s strategic 
responses and their effectiveness in promoting integration through law. In constellation I, the Court is 
largely unconstrained by governmental contestation and public politicization: integration through law 
is effective even without particular depoliticizing efforts. In constellations II and III, the Court is faced 
with bottom-up pressures from either public politicization or governmental contestation: both, ‘law as 
a mask’ and ‘law as a shield’ are responses of ‘assertive depoliticization’ (Bressanelli et al. 2019), i.e. 
they enable the Court to rule expansively despite bottom-up pressure. Finally, in constellation IV, 
public politicization and governmental contestation constitute a ‘constraining consensus’ for the 
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Court: a strategy of judicial self-restraint is necessary to protect the Court’s recognition as a non-
political institution and to avoid political backlash more generally.  
 Public politicization  
No Yes  
 
Governmental 
contestation 
No (I) 
Permissive consensus 
(II) 
Law as a mask 
Yes (III) 
Law as a shield 
(IV) 
Constraining consensus 
Table 1: Four constellations of CJEU contestation 
(I) Unsurprisingly, the Court is least constrained in its role as an engine of integration in the absence of 
both, governmental contestation and public politicization. Arguably, this constellation has 
predominated for the long period of the ‘permissive consensus’ and in particular in the core area of 
EU single market integration. The public exhibited a permissive attitude to elite-driven integration in 
general and largely ignored the ‘quiet revolution’ (Weiler 1994) with the Court as the ‘unsung hero’ of 
integration (Burley and Mattli 1993: 43) in particular. Member state governments disliked some 
rulings, but generally welcomed the Court’s role in overcoming political obstacles to European market 
integration. Even if individual judgments were met with opposition from one or two governments, this 
hardly constrained the Court. As disagreement over the direction and contents of law are defining 
features of law-making (Madsen et. al. 2018: 202), contestation by individual member states hardly 
constrains the court or challenges its authority – but merely constitutes business as usual (Larsson and 
Naurin 2016: 392; Hofmann 2018).  
(II) Burley’s and Mattli’s original argument about law as a mask mainly referred to the Court itself 
‘masking’ the political implications of its jurisprudence. We amend this argument in light of our two 
qualifications above. Given that member state governments have become more alert to Court-driven 
integration over time, they can unmask unwelcome integration through law more readily. However, 
they may prefer and protect the mask of law in light of public politicization, i.e. whenever they share 
the Court’s interest in promoting integration, but shy away from taking the political responsibility for 
unpopular decisions. As a consequence, the function of law as a mask is most powerful when the Court 
and member state governments collude. Under these circumstances, governments may prefer to shift 
decision-making to the seemingly neutral area of the judiciary, while tacitly agreeing with the political 
substance of Court-driven integration through law. By arguing ‘We are sorry, but it’s the law’, member 
state governments can at least partly shift the blame to the Court. At the same time, the Court’s 
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authority remains unquestioned and member state governments do not undermine the impact of its 
jurisprudence.  
(III) The Court can use law as a shield most forcefully, when governments are opposed to a specific 
ruling, but their opposition is not paralleled by strong public politicization of that issue. In this 
constellation, the Court has a particular interest in delivering high quality judgments, which are difficult 
to challenge on legal grounds. References to established precedent serve to emphasize overall legal 
coherence and certainty (Schmidt 2012: 10) and to justify further expansionary jurisprudence: ‘where 
the “mask of law” has already fallen … the Court argues more carefully, by means of reference to 
precedent’ (Larsson et al. 2016: 881). Under these circumstances, any attempt to deliberately politicize 
and to openly resist the Court’s jurisprudence is likely to backfire for member state governments. 
Throughout the union, citizens tend to have greater trust in the CJEU than in their own government 
(or, actually, any other EU institution, see Kelemen 2012: 48f.). Moreover, even if governments are 
very unhappy with an individual judgment, questioning the general authority of an otherwise 
functional court would be a high price to pay. Consequently, they seek ways to limit the impact of CJEU 
jurisprudence by legal means, e.g. through legislative modification at the EU level or creative 
compliance domestically (Hofmann 2018). Such measures may contain the impact of individual rulings 
considerably, but by countering the case law on its own legal terms, they do not call into question the 
Court’s overall authority.  
(IV) Finally, CJEU judges may become confronted with the fourth constellation: a ‘constraining 
consensus’ where governmental contestation occurs together with public politicization. While ‘law as 
a mask’ crucially depends on the collusion of governments and while law ‘shields’ the Court from 
political attacks without public resonance, both protective mechanisms fail in face of joint opposition 
from member state governments and the general public. This constellation occurs rarely since CJEU 
judgements usually do not reach broad visibility while at the same time being collectively opposed by 
several governments. Such bottom-up pressure is most likely to arise when the Court develops 
innovative rulings against the expressed intent of the EU legislature which affect matters of high 
political significance (Hofmann 2018: 260; Madsen et. al. 2018: 205). If, however, the Court continues 
to drive integration against such a ‘constraining consensus’, it risks being perceived as a political actor 
who can also be challenged in political terms. Contestation, then, will not just aim at reducing the 
impact of individual rulings, but target the Court’s general authority to rule expansively. Under these 
circumstances, the technical complexity of case law may even have the inverse effect of what 
neofunctionalists described, i.e. populists may (ab)use the opaque and complex character of individual 
cases and paint ‘law as a caricature’ to make vastly exaggerated anti-EU claims. As a consequence, we 
would expect CJEU judges to back down in the face of a ‘constraining consensus’ and to limit or even 
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reverse expansive jurisprudence. Even if this scenario occurs only rarely, its relevance may be broader, 
namely if CJEU judges exert self-restraint in anticipation of possible backlash.  
In sum, our typology refines the original mask and shield argument by specifying the constellations 
under which each of these functions of law plays a particular role and by adding public politicization 
as an important contextual factor for European judges. It implies one basic hypothesis: effective 
integration through case law becomes less likely as we move from constellations (I) to (IV). Apart from 
the law itself, the Court is least constrained (I) under a permissive consensus and (II) when law serves 
as a mask. The Court may (III) continue to rule expansively even against member state opposition and 
use law as a shield against outright political attacks, but the impact of expansive jurisprudence is 
limited. Finally, (IV) under the rare constellation of a constraining consensus, the Court is limited not 
only with respect to its impact, but in its ability to rule expansively in the first place.  
Empirical illustration 
In the following, we illustrate these four ideal typical constellations with empirical evidence from a 
joint project on the free movement and equal treatment of EU citizens, complemented with well-
researched examples from other policy areas. We, thereby, focus on a rather extreme set of cases, 
which are not meant to ‘test’ causal hypotheses or ‘represent’ CJEU case law in general. Instead, these 
cases are particularly useful for illustrative purposes as they come close to the ideal types 
conceptualized above and they cover the full spectrum of our typology. First, while case law on the 
free movement of workers reaches back to the earliest phases of integration and of the permissive 
consensus, it is arguably the area in which the Court ruled most strongly against member state 
opposition (Larsson and Naurin 2016: 396). Secondly, while many CJEU judgments do not reach any 
public attention (Dederke 2018: 18), the free movement of EU citizens and especially their cross-border 
access to social welfare has become increasingly politicized in recent years. We have thus chosen a set 
of cases where legal integration has occurred for long and considerably, while at the same time politics 
is a play (Martinsen 2015: 10).  
(I) Permissive consensus 
In terms of producing cases, the CJEU has been remarkably effective. Between 1961-2014, the Court 
decided in more than 7000 preliminary rulings and infringement proceedings (Martinsen 2015: 11). 
Most cases have concerned agriculture and fisheries, second comes internal market interpretations 
concerning free movement of goods and thirdly judicial decisions within the social realm. Arguably, 
the largest pile of these cases were never politically controversial, but merely rather technical legal 
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disputes, relevant for the parties involved but without broader implications. However, famous cases 
such as Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. from 1963-1964 certainly fall in this category of 
integration through law and were enabled by a permissive consensus. New historical research has 
shown that these landmark cases did indeed cause some political concern, but the majority of 
governments did not mobilize against the new legal order constructed (Rasmussen 2017).  
Expansive CJEU jurisprudence has largely shaped the free movement and equal treatment of workers 
for decades, enabled by the permissive consensus. Originally, the right to cross-border welfare in the 
European Union was restricted to workers by means of Regulation 1612/68 (now 492/2011) and 
Regulation 1408/71 (now 883/2004), entitling Community migrant workers to equal treatment with 
national citizens on social rights and tax advantages next to exporting social-security rights across 
member-states borders. This original regulatory framework of the 1960s has gradually extended its 
personal and material scope by means of CJEU case law and legislative revisions. The Court’s early 
jurisprudence laid down that the purpose of the Treaty was to establish as ‘complete a freedom of 
movement for workers as possible’ (Case 75/63 Hoekstra). It later extended the personal scope to also 
include the self-employed (Case 17/76 Brack) and clarified the rights of the family members (Case 7/75 
Fracas; C-308/93 Cabanis-Issarte). In addition, a permissive consensus allowed the Court to develop 
an inclusive concept of who is a worker according to EU law. In the case of Kempf (C-139/85), the CJEU 
established that working 12 hours per week would suffice, and in the case of Megner and Scheffel (C-
444/93), it ruled that 10 hours of work per week did not exclude a person from being regarded as a 
worker.  
EU gender equality has been another often cited cluster of case law, used to illustrate the power of 
integration through law (Cichowski 2004). The Defrenne cases from 1971 and 1976 were crucial in 
defining the meaning and effect of the Treaty’s declaration on equal pay and initiated an important 
process of judicial and political integration, which proved that litigation can be an important tool to 
push for change. In the Defrenne II case from 1976, a Belgian Court asked if the Treaty’s article 119 
had direct effect, creating enforceable rights for individuals in national courts without EU secondary 
legislation or national legislation transposing it. The Court disregarded objections by the UK and Ireland 
and confirmed the direct effect of article 119. Other important cases followed as for example Danfoss 
(C-109/88) on equal pay and Dekker (C-177/88) concerning the rights of pregnant workers among 
many others. The Court’s jurisprudence was later codified into important pieces of secondary 
legislation (see for example the burden of proof directive 97/80 adopted in 1997). A large part of 
gender equality case law occurred without any significant governmental contestation despite their 
political and also financial implications. Although some member states disliked the rulings, there was 
no broader collective mobilization or public politicization for or against them.  
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(II) Law as a mask 
While law may hide political conflict in various ways, e.g. when the broader and long-term 
consequences of individual rulings go unnoticed by member state governments, the aspect of law as a 
mask is essential when governments tacitly endorse integration through law, but do not want to 
overtly take political responsibility. Theoretically, such a scenario in which governments shift decision-
making (and blame) for unpopular decisions is highly plausible, but empirically, these cases are 
inherently difficult to document. The Court’s role in these cases lies precisely in serving as a forum in 
which governments can hide politically conflictual issues behind a mask of technical, legal reasoning. 
And governments are assumed to remain silent or even to delude the public about their actual 
preferences.  
Nevertheless, we can draw on some well-researched examples from the posting of workers to illustrate 
this constellation. The question of which labor standards apply to workers, who are posted from one 
EU member state to another, was at the heart of the ‘Laval quartet’ (Blauberger 2012). In three of 
these four landmark judgments, the Court interpreted the Posting of Workers Directive extensively 
and ruled against national restrictions of the free movement of services (Martinsen 2015). The cases 
were mainly perceived as pitting old against new EU member states, with the CJEU favoring further 
liberalization and, thus, siding with new EU member states (Lindstrom 2010). And yet, there is 
considerable evidence that the Court rulings were also received with the tacit approval of some 
conservative-liberal governments in the old member states. The Rüffert judgment (C-346/06) had the 
greatest impact in those German regions governed by conservative-liberal coalitions, where it was 
used to abolish the contested domestic rules without replacement (Sack 2012). The Laval judgment 
(C-341/05) triggered various domestic reform processes, which went furthest in Sweden, where a 
conservative-liberal government was under strong influence from major business interests (Seikel 
2015). Arguably, in these cases, the mask of EU law worked better for the governments involved than 
for the CJEU itself. Since these cases were already politicized when they reached the Court, European 
judges were hardly able to mask the underlying political conflicts and had to take inevitably unpopular 
rulings. By contrast, the Court’s rulings enabled liberal-conservative governments to enact domestic 
reforms, which could be portrayed as EU legal necessities.  
Another policy area in which EU law typically serves to mask political conflict is the control of state aid. 
Over time, the Commission has been able to incrementally tighten the control of state aid in the EU, 
largely supported by the CJEU, but also with the tacit agreement of member state governments 
(Blauberger 2009). Governments share a collective interest in avoiding subsidy races and reaping the 
benefits of undistorted competition, but they are vulnerable to political pressures from potential 
beneficiaries among their constituents. For example, governments are regularly called upon to save 
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domestic enterprises (and their jobs) from bankruptcy by granting state aid. Under these 
circumstances, governments often readily refer to the constraints imposed by EU rules to deny state 
aid, while shifting the ultimate responsibility and blame to the European level. 
(III) Law as a shield 
The case law on the free movement of workers post-Maastricht offers plenty of evidence on how the 
Court’s jurisprudence is shielded from outright political attacks despite challenges by member state 
governments. Since Maastricht, the Court has significantly extended the rights to move freely and to 
be treated equally from workers to EU citizens more generally (Wollenschläger 2011). The actual 
impact of the Court’s citizenship jurisprudence, however, has been more limited. Already before the 
Court has shifted its own course (see next section), member state governments have effectively limited 
its impact through legislative modification at the EU level and contained compliance at the domestic 
level. Modification means compromises between legislative actors where specific articles or annexes 
insert more national control, more national discretion, exemptions or special rules (Martinsen 2015: 
35-36). Such mitigating articles confines the implications of the case law nationally and in its practical 
application. For example, the expansive Grzelczyk ruling (C-184/99) from 2001 laid down that Union 
citizenship entitles students from other member states to the social assistance of a hosting member 
state if a certain link with the society of their host state has been established. Soon after, however, the 
member governments constructed a delicate compromise with the European parliament in the 
Citizenship directive 2004/38 (Wasserfallen 2010), where article 24.2 aimed to modify the implications 
of the Court ruling by stating that member states are not obliged to confer entitlement to study grants 
or student loans before permanent residence has been acquired. Modification thus expresses 
governmental contestation to Court rulings, but is still a milder form of political pushback than upright 
rebellion against the authority of the Court. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that the impact of 
the Court’s citizenship jurisprudence was limited from the beginning due to restrictive implementation 
at the domestic level (Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017; Martinsen et al. 2018). 
Moving beyond the area of EU citizenship, we also find examples of more severe measures to limit the 
Court’s impact by legal means. Most often, the threshold to agree on legislative override is too high 
for member state governments, which is why they resort to modification as a second best option. And 
yet, there are some examples of legislative override. Again gender equality is illustrative, where the 
political receptiveness of legal innovations ended abruptly with the adoption of the Maastricht treaty 
in 1993. The Court’s Barber case (C-262/88) from 1990 had laid down that the principle of equal 
treatment also applied to age of retirement. This time, member states and employers argued strongly 
against the Barber case’s conclusions and the member states unanimously adopted the Barber 
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protocol in the Maastricht Treaty to limit the implication of the judgement (Craig and De Búrca 2011 
864). Governments may also try to weaken the relative importance of the Court for the integration 
process more generally. For example, they restricted the power of the Court when they excluded its 
jurisdiction from two of the three Maastricht Treaty pillars (Burley and Mattli 1993).  
(IV) Constraining consensus 
Finally, the Court faces a ‘constraining consensus’ under very particular circumstances – namely, if the 
Court is continuously supplied with new cases in an area, in which further integration is opposed 
simultaneously by more member governments and public opinion. In this situation, the Court has to 
make decisions without, however, law serving as a mask or shield insulating the Court from 
governmental and public opposition. By extending integration through law regardless of political and 
public opposition, the Court would even exacerbate politicization. As a consequence, the Court is likely 
to be responsive and to exert self-restaint in face of strongly voiced political and public objections. 
In the area of free movement and cross border welfare, legal integration for many years advanced not 
only the social rights of workers but also of non-economically active EU citizens. Based on European 
citizenship enshrined in the Treaty, the Court was heralded for adding real rights and substance to an 
otherwise empty political concept. In core cases, such as Martínez Sala (C-85/96), Grzelczyk (C-184/99), 
Baumbast (C-413/99) and Trojani (C-456/02), the Court extended the principle of equal treatment to 
lawfully residing Union citizens, not on the basis of their economic activities but ‘purely’ as citizens of 
the Union. It thus declared that Union citizenship as ‘destined to become the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’ (Grzelczyk, para. 31). However, during the last five years political and 
public critique against free movement and cross border welfare rights has sounded louder. Member 
state governments, not the least from the UK, had already called for greater national discretion 
regarding the regulation of EU migrants’ welfare access for several years. In addition, between 2013 
and 2015, the public debate around the theme of ‘welfare migration’ increasingly politicized EU 
citizens entitlements to welfare in a hosting member state in several member states (Blauberger et al. 
2018). ‘Welfare tourism’ came to feature as a negatively framed concept in the public debate. At the 
same time, the recent citizenship jurisprudence shows that the CJEU is not immune to the public 
temper. The previously expansive Union citizenship jurisprudence has turned into a remarkably 
restrictive course of legal integration with the cases of Dano (C‑333/13) in November 2014, Alimanovic 
(C-67/14) in September 2015, Garcia-Nieto Garcia-Nieto (C-299/14) in April 2016 and in June 2016 with 
the Commission v. UK (C-308/14) infringement case. The Union citizenship of the treaty is no longer 
the reference point in the Court cases; instead the later restrictive interpretations are based on the 
conditions of secondary legislation as stated in the Citizenship directive. In its restrictive case law on 
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free movement and cross border welfare, the Court not only proves attentive to the EU legislature, 
but sensitive to the broader political context and has turned away from expanding right of non-
economically active EU citizens (Blauberger et al. 2018). 
The ‘Laval quartet’ was already discussed above as it provided interested governments with a short-
term opportunity to mask their own preference and to shift the blame for unpopular decisions to the 
CJEU. In the longer run, however, the Court could not sustain its expansive jurisprudence as it became 
confronted with a constraining consensus. The Court’s judgments triggered unprecedented public 
criticism (Scharpf 2008) as well as resistance by a significant number of member states. In 2012, the 
Commission’s attempt to codify the Court’s case law in the so-called ‘Monti II Regulation’ led to the 
first activation ever of the Early Warning Mechanism by twelve national parliaments. When asked to 
further clarify its interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive in subsequent cases, the Court 
‘readjusted its position to the benefit of national social regulatory autonomy’ (Garben 2017: 38). In the 
case Elektrobudowa (C-396/13), the Court sided with the claims of a Finnish trade union and adopted 
an unexpectedly generous interpretation of what could be subsumed under the crucial term of 
‘minimum rates of pay’. In response to the Rüffert judgment (C-346/06), most German regions revised 
their public procurement legislation in order to protect as much as possible of its original substance in 
an EU-compatible way (Blauberger 2012: 118). When this legislation was challenged again in the 
Regiopost case (C-115-/14), the Court disagreed with the Commission and shifted its previous position: 
‘To avoid an explicit and principled reversal of its case law, the Court confines the ruling to the specific 
facts (…) But even if the extent to which Laval, Rüffert, Luxembourg and Bundesdruckerei have been 
overturned is open to discussion, the permissive signal to Member States and their courts is a strong 
one’ (Garben 2017: 39). 
Finally, another politically sensitive area, in which the Court appears to exert self-restraint in 
anticipation of (rather than in response to) a constraining consensus, is the area of fundamental rights. 
Member state governments have been cautious not to facilitate unwarranted CJEU intervention into 
domestic affairs and limited the scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
‘to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’ (Article 51 of the Charter). 
Obviously, any attempt to extend the Charter’s scope of application through case law hinges on the 
interpretation of when member states ‘are implementing Union law’ and the Court has raised some 
expectations that it might adopt an expansive interpretation (e.g. in the Åkerberg Fransson case, C-
617/10). Yet, in contrast to these expectations and despite numerous ‘invitations’ to do so, the Court 
has so far refrained from an extensive interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter. Apart from the (lack 
of) legal basis, the current CJEU judge von Danwiz justifies the Court’s restraint with a more or less 
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explicit reference to the potential politicization which could be caused by greater judicial activism (von 
Danwitz 2014). 
Conclusion 
25 years have passed since Burley and Mattli first presented legal integration to function as a mask 
and a shield (Burley and Mattli 1993). Since then, political awareness of the outcomes of integration 
through law has grown significantly and EU legislative actions as well as national counter-actions limit 
the political power of the Court. Member states have become more skillful in penetrating the shield of 
law and as EU integration has moved into core areas of national sovereignty, the political implications 
of jurisprudence have become harder to mask. Public opinion increasingly forms for or against EU 
policies in general and partly even for or against specific judicial interpretations. As a consequence, 
growing politicization has become an additional scope condition for the CJEU to acknowledge and, 
under peculiar circumstance, a ‘constraining consensus’ may restrict the possible outcomes of 
integration through law, when public politicization is paralleled by member state opposition to 
expansive CJEU jurisprudence.  
The judges in Luxembourg are not immune to this ‘constraining consensus’. The CJEU appears to be 
sensitive to changes in the broader political context. This is not to say that the European Court has 
become or is likely to become politicized itself in the sense of taking a more ideological political side, 
but rather that public politicization constrains the CJEU’s ability to promote integration through law. 
Ultimately, the Court’s legitimacy depends on its jurisprudence being accepted and complied with and 
there is only that much opposition a judicial authority can take. Moreover, once an issue has already 
become broadly politicized, we should not overestimate the Court’s ability to simply depoliticize it 
again by the mere force of law. Hence, despite the function of law as a mask and shield, growing 
politicization as a scope condition is largely exogenously given for the Court. 
 
Biographical notes  
Michael Blauberger is Professor at the University of Salzburg ((https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
3581-400X). Dorte S. Martinsen is Professor at the University of Copenhagen 
(https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2113-0950).  
15 
 
Address for correspondence 
Michael Blauberger, Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg, 
Mönchsberg 2, 5020 Salzburg, Austria. Email: michael.blauberger@sbg.ac.at. 
Acknowledgements  
We would like to thank Christine Reh, R. Daniel Kelemen and three anonymous reviewers for 
their very helpful comments.  
16 
 
References 
Alter, K. J. (1998a) 'Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration', in A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. 
Weiler (eds.), The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal 
Change in its Social Context. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 227-252. 
Alter, K. J. (1998b) 'Who Are the 'Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the European 
Court of Justice', International Organization 52(1): 121-147. 
Alter, K. J., Helfer, L. and Madsen, M. R. (eds.) (2018) International Court Authority, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Blauberger, M. (2009) 'Of 'Good' and 'Bad' Subsidies: European State Aid Control through Soft and 
Hard Law', West European Politics 32(4): 719-737. 
Blauberger, M. (2012) 'With Luxembourg in Mind … The Remaking of National Policies in the Face of 
ECJ Jurisprudence', Journal of European Public Policy 19(1): 109–126. 
Blauberger, M., Heindlmaier, A., Kramer, D., Martinsen, D. S., Sampson Thierry, J., Schenk, A. and 
Werner, B. (2018) 'ECJ judges read the morning papers. Explaining the turnaround of 
European citizenship jurisprudence', Journal of European Public Policy 25(10): 1422-1441. 
Bresanelli, E., Koop, C. and Reh, C. (2019) 'EU Actors under Pressure: Politicisation and 
Depolicitisation as Strategic Responses', this issue.  
Burley, A.-M. and Mattli, W. (1993) 'Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration', 
International Organization 47(1): 41-76. 
Carrubba, C. J. and Gabel, M. J. (2015) International Courts and the Performance of International 
Agreements. A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cichowski, R. A. (2004) 'Women's Rights, the European Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism', 
Law & Society Review 38(3): 489-512. 
Conant, L. (2002) Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Conant, L., Hofmann, A., Soennecken, D. and Vanhala, L. (2018) 'Mobilizing European Law', Journal of 
European Public Policy 25(9): 1376-1389. 
de Wilde, P., Leupold, A. and Schmidtke, H. (2016) 'Introduction: the Differentiated Politicisation of 
European Governance', West European Politics 39(1): 3-22. 
Dederke, J. (2018) Media Attention against all Odds, or Politicization as Usual? Introducing Case 
Salience Data for CJEU Cases, Paris: Paper presented at the ECPR-SGEU conference, 13-15 
June 2018. 
Dumbrovsky, T., Petkova, B. and Van der Sluis, M. (2014) 'Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 
TFEU Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States', Common Market Law 
Review 51(2): 455-482. 
Ferejohn, J. (2002) 'Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law', Law and Contemporary Problems 65(3): 41-
68. 
Garben, S. (2017) 'The Constitutional (Im)balance between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in the 
European Union', European Constitutional Law Review 13(1): 23-61. 
Heindlmaier, A. and Blauberger, M. (2017) 'Enter at your own risk: free movement of EU citizens in 
practice', West European Politics 40(6): 1198-1217. 
Hofmann, A. (2018) 'Resistance against the Court of Justice of the European Union', International 
Journal of Law in Context 14(2): 258-274. 
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', British Journal of Political Science 39(1): 1-
23. 
Kelemen, R. D. (2011) Eurolegalism. The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European 
Union, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
17 
 
Kelemen, R. D. (2012) 'The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European Union', 
Journal of European Public Policy 19(1): 43-58. 
Kelemen, R. D. (2016) 'The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First Century', Law 
and Contemporary Problems 79(1): 117-140. 
Larsson, O. and Naurin, D. (2016) 'Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the Risk of 
Override Impacts on the Court of Justice of the EU', International Organization 70(1): 377-
408. 
Larsson, O. and Naurin, D. (2019) 'Split Vision: Multidimensionality in the European Union’s Legal 
Policy Space', International Studies Quarterly early view online: 1-15. 
Larsson, O., Naurin, D., Derlén, M. and Lindholm, J. (2016) 'Speaking Law to Power: The Strategic Use 
of Precedent of the Court of Justice of the European Union', Comparative Political Studies 
50(7): 879-907. 
Lindstrom, N. (2010) 'Service Liberalization in the Enlarged EU: A Race to the Bottom or the 
Emergence of Transnational Political Conflict?', Journal of Common Market Studies 48(5): 
1307-1327. 
Madsen, M. R., Cebulak, P. and Wiebusch, M. (2018) 'Backlash against International Courts: 
Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts', International 
Journal of Law in Context 14(2): 197-220. 
Martinsen, D. S. (2015) An Ever More Powerful Court? The Political Constraints of Legal Integration in 
the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Martinsen, D. S., Rotger, G. P. and Thierry, J. S. (2018) 'Free movement of People and Cross-Border 
Welfare in the European Union: Dynamic Rules, Limited Outcomes', Journal of European 
Social Policy. 
Mattli, W. and Slaughter, A.-M. (1998) 'Revisiting the European Court of Justice', International 
Organization 52(1): 177-209. 
McGuire, K. T. and Stimson, J. A. (2004) 'The least dangerous branch revisited: New evidence on 
Supreme Court responsiveness to public preferences', Journal of Politics 66(4): 1018-1035. 
Pierson, P. (1996) 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective', 
Comparative Political Studies 29(2): 123-163. 
Rasmussen, M. (2017) 'How to enforce European law? A new history of the battle over the direct 
effect of Directives, 1958–1987', European Law Journal 23(3-4): 290-308. 
Sack, D. (2012) 'Europeanization Through Law, Compliance, and Party Differences. The ECJ’s ‘Rüffert’ 
Judgment (C-346/06) and Amendments to Public Procurement Laws in German Federal 
States', Journal of European Integration 34(3): 241-260. 
Scharpf, F. W. (2008) 'Der einzige Weg ist, dem EuGH nicht zu folgen', Mitbestimmung 54(7+8): 18-
23. 
Schmidt, S. K. (2012) 'Who cares about nationality? The path-dependent case law of the ECJ from 
goods to citizens', Journal of European Public Policy 19(1): 8-24. 
Seikel, D. (2015) 'Class struggle in the shadow of Luxembourg. The domestic impact of the European 
Court of Justice’s case law on the regulation of working conditions', Journal of European 
Public Policy 22(8): 1166-1185. 
Stein, E. (1981) 'Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', American Journal 
of International Law 75(1): 1-27. 
Stone Sweet, A. (2010) 'The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance', 
Living Reviews in European Governance 5(2): 1-54. 
von Danwitz, T. (2014) 'The Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ', Fordham 
International Law Journal 37(5): 1311-1346. 
Wasserfallen, F. (2010) 'The Judiciary as Legislator? How the European Court of Justice Shapes Policy-
making in the European Union', Journal of European Public Policy 17(8): 1128–1146. 
Weiler, J. H. H. (1991) 'The Transformation of Europe', The Yale Law Journal 100(1): 2402-2483. 
Weiler, J. H. H. (1994) 'A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors', 
Comparative Political Studies 26(4): 510-534. 
18 
 
Weiler, J. H. H. (2013) 'Epilogue: Judging the Judges - Apology and Critique', in M. Adams, H. de 
Waele and J. Meeusen (eds.), Judging Europe's Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the 
European Court of Justice. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 235-254. 
Wollenschläger, F. (2011) 'A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union 
Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration', 
European Law Journal 17(1): 1-34. 
  
